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Note
DeSHANEY V. WINNEBAGO COUNTY: THE NARROWING
SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
INTRODUCTION
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,' the
Supreme Court held that a county's failure to protect a child from
private violence of which the county was aware was not a violation of
the child's rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
agreed with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' that the negative
language of the fourteenth amendment cannot be interpreted as im-
posing an affirmative obligation on states to protect individuals
from third parties.4 Moreover, because the State had not acted af-
firmatively to restrain the child's personal liberty in any way, the
State had no duty to protect the child on the premise that he was
unable to protect himself.5
This Note discusses DeShaney's impact on actions against states
that allege the state's failure to protect an individual. By rejecting
the emerging doctrine of special relationships, DeShaney once again
confines claims alleging fourteenth amendment due process viola-
tions for a state's failure to protect the narrow circumstances of cus-
todial relationships. The Court sends a hard message to plaintiffs:
"the fourteenth amendment ... does not transform every tort com-
mitted by a state actor into a constitutional violation;" 6 seek your
remedy under state law. This Note, however, concludes that the
Court need not have gone so far. The Court's focus on whether the
due process clause charges states with an affirmative duty to act,7
and its perfunctory review of the facts,' foreclosed inquiry as to
whether the child actually was injured as a consequence of a state
1. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id.
3. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
4. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
5. Id. at 1005-06.
6. Id. at 1007.
7. Id. at 1003.
8. Id. at 1006.
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action. Furthermore, the overly narrow interpretation of the depri-
vation of liberty necessary to trigger a state's duty to protect an indi-
vidual is wholly unnecessary to protect states. Existing doctrines
already give governmental entities significant protection from
liability. 9
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
Shortly after his divorce in 1980, Randy DeShaney moved from
Wyoming to Winnebago County, Wisconsin, with his one-year-old
son, Joshua; there, DeShaney remarried and subsequently divorced
again." °  At the time of the second divorce in early 1982,
DeShaney's second wife informed the police that Randy had hit the
boy and was " 'a prime case for child abuse.' "" The police then
notified the Winnebago County Department of Social Services
(DSS) of the charge pursuant to a Wisconsin law that directs citizens
and governmental actors to rely on the DSS to protect children from
abuse.' 2 The DSS interviewed Randy DeShaney, but dropped its in-
vestigation when he denied all charges.'"
One year later, Joshua was admitted with multiple bruises and
abrasions to a local hospital.' 4 Emergency room personnel notified
the DSS, which took temporary custody of Joshua and convened an
ad hoc "Child Protection Team" three days later to consider his sit-
uation. 15 The team found the evidence of abuse insufficient to keep
Joshua in the court's custody. Before the DSS returned Joshua to
his father, however, it obtained a voluntary agreement from Randy
DeShaney to (1) receive counseling, (2) enroll Joshua in preschool,
9. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
10. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001.
11. Id. (quoting Appendix at 152-53, DeShaney (No. 87-15A)).
12. See id. at 1010 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The Wisconsin statute entitled "Persons
required to report," exhaustively lists public and private workers who must report cases
of suspected child abuse to the local DSS office or law enforcement agency. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.981(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). A penalty of $1,000 and/or six months in
prison may be imposed on those who intentionally violate the statute by failing to report
"as required." Id. § 48.981(6). Reports made to a local law enforcement agency, in
turn, must be transmitted to the local DSS within 12 hours (excluding weekends). Id.
§ 48.981(3). At this point, duties arise within the DSS to (1) investigate within 24 hours,
(2) provide immediate protection if necessary, (3) provide various services, (4) make
determinations as to the likelihood of past or future abuse, (5) maintain records, (6)
inform the original reporter of actions taken, (7) cooperate with the police and courts,
(8) report to DSS headquarters, and (9) petition for restraining orders and injunctions.
Id. § 4 8.981(3)(c)1-9.
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and (3) move his girlfriend out of the home.' 6 During the next year,
DeShaney reneged on his agreement and the hospital twice more
admitted Joshua with suspicious injuries to the emergency room.' 7
Emergency room personnel again reported the injuries to the
DSS. Is In addition, a DSS caseworker made nearly twenty visits to
the home,' 9 which ultimately led her to state, "I just knew the phone
would ring some day and Joshua would be dead.""0 In March 1984,
Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that the child suffered ex-
tensive, irreparable brain damage and, as a result, is expected to
spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the pro-
foundly retarded.2 ' Joshua's father was tried and convicted of child
abuse.22
Joshua and his mother brought suit under title 42, section 1983
of the United States Code 23 in the United States District Court for
the District of Eastern Wisconsin against Winnebago County, its De-
partment of Social Services, and various individual employees of the
Department. 24 The complaint alleged that the defendants had de-
prived Joshua of his liberty interest in "free[dom] from . . . unjusti-




19. Id. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298,
300 (7th Cir. 1987)).
21. Id. at 1002.
22. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), the Civil Rights Act of 1871, reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
For the historical background of § 1983, see Note, Section 1983 and the Due Process Clause:
Crossing the Constitutional Line, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 789, 791-95 (1989). For the Supreme
Court's construction of § 1983, see Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction of Civil Rights
Act of 1871 (42 USCS § 1983) Providing Private Right of Action for Violation of Federal Rights,
43 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1976).
24. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002. Not until Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), was § 1983 understood to implicate municipalities as "per-
sons" subject to liability. Id. at 690 (holding that municipal entities can be held liable
under § 1983 for deprivations pursuant to custom or policy). The Monell Court, how-
ever, did not address the full extent of municipal liability under § 1983. See id. at 694-
95.
25. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673
(1977)).
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when they failed to intervene and protect him from the violence they
knew or should have known his father would inflict upon him.26
The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.27
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in a decision
delivered by Judge Posner. 28 The Seventh Circuit held both that the
State's failure to protectJoshua did not amount to a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest 29 and that the causal con-
nection between the defendants' conduct and Joshua's injuries was
not sufficient to establish a deprivation of constitutional rights by
the State.3 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of the
lower courts' inconsistent approaches in determining when, if ever,
a state or local government's failure to protect an individual violates
that person's substantive due process rights."'
II. QUESTIONING THE LIMITS OF STATE LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Restraining Lines
Claims arising under section 1983 have been labelled "constitu-
tional tort" claims.3 2 The DeShaney decision responds to a "perplex-
26. Id. at 1002.
27. Id.
28. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1987), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
29. Id. at 301.
30. Id. at 302-03. The court rejected the proposition that a special relationship
arises between the state and the child once the state becomes aware of the danger that
the child may be abused and imposes on the state an affirmative, constitutional duty to
protect the child. Id. at 303.
31. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
32. See Note, supra note 23, at 806. Professor Shapo is credited with coining the term
"constitutional tort," which the Supreme Court has adopted to describe section 1983
claims. Id. at 806 n.108; see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965).
The constitutional tort claim based upon a violation of substantive due process
differs from the typical substantive due process claim in two respects: the nature of the
remedy sought and the type of analysis employed. With respect to remedy, the plaintiff
in a traditional case uses substantive due process to block the government's threatened
action against him; the plaintiff in a constitutional tort case sues to collect damages for
an injury the government already has inflicted on him. With respect to the type of analy-
sis employed, the plaintiff in a traditional case attacks some legislatively-imposed obliga-
tion on the grounds that it is an affront to some aspect of his personal autonomy which is
not protected under the Bill of Rights; the court then balances democratic values against
the competing claim of personal autonomy. By contrast, the plaintiff in a constitutional
tort case alleges that the government has invaded one of his substantive due process
interests; the court determines under what circumstances such a claim will lie. Wells &




ing" question raised in recent years as such actions have become
more common:"3 What are the outer limits of state liability under
section 1983?14 The question arises because the statute creates no
substantive rights; 35 instead, it provides a remedy for deprivations
of rights established in the Constitution. Thus, the boundaries of
state liability under section 1983 do not extend beyond the bounda-
ries of the substantive rights that were violated. The fourteenth
amendment due process clause, on which Joshua based his action,
generally is understood by its language and history36 and by prior
case law3 7 to limit a state's power to act, not to impose affirmative
duties on it.38 Joshua's attempt to show that the State had an affirm-
ative duty to protect him failed in large part because the Supreme
Court stood by its traditional interpretation of the underlying due
33. See Note, supra note 23, at 791-95 (discussing the paucity of actions brought
under § 1983 during its first 50 years in existence and the significant expansion in its use
following Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
34. SeeJackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1049 (1984).
No problem so perplexes the federal courts today as determining the outer
bounds of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ubiq-
uitous tort remedy for deprivations of rights secured by federal law (primarily
the Fourteenth Amendment) by persons acting under color of state law.
Id.
35. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) ("the statute cre-
ates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights estab-
lished elsewhere"); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144 n.3 (1979) ("first
inquiry in any § 1983 suit . . . is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'se-
cured by the Constitution and laws' ").
36. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003-04.
37. Prior cases have established that "the Due Process Clauses generally [impose no
duty on states to provide] governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to
secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive
an individual." Id. at 1003; see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (hold-
ing that the State does not have an affirmative duty to fund abortions or to provide
medical services; thus, funding restrictions on such services did not violate the fifth
amendment due process clause); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding
that the State does not have an obligation to provide adequate housing).
38. See Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203 ("The Fourteenth Amendment... [seeks] to protect
Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmen-
tal services."). For a discussion of Jackson and constitutional rights, see Currie, Positive
and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 864-67, 886-87 (1986). See also
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695
(supporting the position that the due process clause does not impose affirmative duties).
But see Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407 (1966) (illus-
trating that constitutional rights play a large role in the war against poverty); Michelman,
Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969)
(discussing both the equal protection and due process clauses and their role in provid-
ing minimum welfare for the people); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968
SuP. CT. REV. 199 (suggesting that the concept of affirmative governmental duties is
evolving through Supreme Court decisions).
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process right to liberty. 9
In addition to these substantive rights limitations, plaintiffs may
confront one or more of three generic problems associated with sec-
tion 1983 claims. First, although the Supreme Court has not de-
cided what state of mind of the government actor is sufficient to
support a section 1983 claim, 40 it has determined that mere negli-
gence cannot work an unconstitutional deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, and therefore is insufficient to support such a claim. 4'
Second, a plaintiff confronts a difficult causation problem when he
or she is injured by a private third party rather than an agent of the
governmental entity being sued.42 Third, a plaintiff bears an addi-
tional burden when the defendant is a local governmental entity.
To establish a city's or county's liability, the plaintiff must show that
the injury resulted from a custom, policy, or practice of the munici-
pality.43 Moreover, the Supreme Court, out of respect for federalist
39. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003-04.
40. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335 (1986) (stating simply that "the differ-
ence between one end of the spectrum-negligence-and the other-intent-is abun-
dantly clear" overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)). See generally Mead,
Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can Constitutional Tort
be Saved from Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 23 (1986) (after Monroe, lower courts in
disagreement as to whether negligent state conduct can support § 1983 actions); Note,
supra note 23, at 797-808 (discussing the confusion in the aftermath of Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), in which the Court held that a proper inquiry into a § 1983
claim should not focus on the government actor's state of mind); Note, Daniels, David-
son and the Unlearned Lesson of Parratt v. Taylor: Eliminating Simple Negligence as a Basis for
Procedural Due Process Claims (IfAt First You Don't Succeed, Overrule It), 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 98, 101 (1986) (courts in disagreement as to the level of tortious conduct required
to support § 1983 claims).
41. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329-36; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1986). From the time the Court decided Parratt in 1981, until it overruled that decision
in Daniels in 1986, mere negligence was enough to state a good claim. Parratt held that
"the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation." Id. at
536-37. Prior to Parratt, no Supreme Court decision ever had held that a state official's
negligent conduct, even though it caused injury, could constitute a deprivation under
the due process clause. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331. In the end, Daniels banished the § 1983
claim based upon simple negligence when it overruled Parratt. See Archie v. City of Ra-
cine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1218-20 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (reiterating Daniels and holding
that gross negligence also is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim-recklessness, which
connotes intention, is the minimum requisite state of mind), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338
(1989).
42. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980) (holding that although the
decision to parole an inmate was a state action, the parolee's taking of a life five months
later cannot be fairly characterized as such; in other words, the chain of causation was
too attenuated to support liability).
43. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818-24 (1985); Wideman v. Shal-
lowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding that to
find a local governmental entity liable under § 1983, it is essential for the plaintiff to
show that the injury resulted from a custom, policy, or practice of that entity); Estate of
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principles, has attempted to restrict the scope of substantive due
process claims by excluding those claims that also arise under state
common law or statutes.44
In light of these problems, it is understandable that constitu-
tional tort claims historically have fared better when they alleged a
violation of a specific and well-defined constitutional right-for ex-
ample, a violation of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause 4 5-rather than a due process violation of life, lib-
erty, or property in cases in which the plaintiff's injury is of a kind
typically remedied by state tort law.46 It was on the strength of
eighth amendment claims brought under section 1983 that the
courts began to expand the boundaries of state liability and to test
the barriers discussed above.
Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506-08 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a
municipal policy must be shown, and a plausible nexus must exist between the policy
and the injury). The expansion of § 1983's scope to include municipalities as persons
subject to liability did not go so far as to impose municipal liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 825-33 (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Wells & Eaton, supra note 32, at 209. Wells and Eaton note that:
The importance of making the separation may be understood as part of
the broader concern for preserving discretion and diversity in the development
of tort law. The due process clause, fears the Court, could engulf all torts com-
mitted by all government officials. Such a development would unduly infringe
upon the legitimate exercise of legislative and judicial discretion in the shaping
of tort rules since constitutional tort cannot be modified by state law.
Id.
Wells and Eaton cite four cases which effectively have limited the scope of constitu-
tional tort claims: (1) Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (fourteenth amendment
would become a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever system is already
administered by state); (2) Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674, 682 (1977) (state tort
remedies provide due process of law; recognition of claim as constitutional tort would
intrude into an area of "primary educational responsibility"); (3) Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (false imprisonment claim may be good under tort law analysis, but
is not enough for a constitutional claim); and (4) Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544 (granting con-
stitutional status to claim would turn every alleged injury inflicted by state officials into a
violation of the fourteenth amendment). Wells & Eaton, supra note 32, at 203-08.
Lastly, Wells and Eaton also comment that in these four decisions, the Court re-
peatedly stumbled by failing to articulate whether it perceived the claims it addressed to
be violations of the substantive or procedural components of the due process clause. As
a result, the four opinions taken together limit the scope of constitutional torts, but offer
little guidance in analyzing a constitutional tort cause of action. Id. at 215-21.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
46. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 32, at 202.
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B. Pushing the Limits
1. The Estelle-Youngberg Line: Custodial Relationships .- In
1976, the Court in Estelle v. Gamble4 7 reasoned that the state must
have a duty to care for those who are incarcerated because they are
not free to care for themselves.48 Specifically, the Court held that a
state's deliberate indifference to a prison inmate's medical needs
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend-
ment.49 Following Estelle, the circuit courts began to impose on gov-
ernments an affirmative duty of care to protect prisoners, under the
eighth amendment. 50 The courts' growing recognition of an affirm-
ative duty to care for prisoners led the Second Circuit in Doe v. New
York City Department of Social Services5 to hold that Estelle also re-
quired the State to oversee a child in a foster home.5 2 Breaking new
ground, the court applied an eighth amendment analysis to Doe's
fourteenth amendment claim by analogizing the New York Depart-
ment of Social Services' failure to protect a foster child to a state
prison's failure to protect an inmate.53 The court also stated that
47. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
48. Id. at 103-05. The Court found that prison personnel's deliberate indifference to
a prisoner's serious illness or injury constituted cruel and unusual punishment that con-
travened the eighth amendment. Id. at 104-05. Increasingly, the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause has been interpreted expansively to embody "'broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' " against which penal
measures must be evaluated. Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579
(8th Cir. 1968)).
49. Id. at 104-05. The plaintiff in this case did not establish deliberate indifference.
Id. at 106-08.
50. See, e.g., Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir.) (holding that the failure
of prison officials to devise a procedure for screening inmates' files to insure some com-
patibility with cellmates constituted "deliberate indifference" and thus was a violation of
the cruel and unusual punishment clause), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2832 (1988); Watts v.
Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172-74 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the failure of officials to
protect a prisoner from attacks by other prisoners, when a "strong likelihood" of attack
existed, constituted a violation of the prisoner's eighth amendment rights), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1085 (1986). But see Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 653-56 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that the conduct of prison officials, relating to a bus accident in which
chained prisoners were injured, did not constitute deliberate indifference), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 816 (1986).
51. 649 F.2d 134, 141-42, 145 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Doe I] (applying the delib-
erate indifference test of Estelle when the State had placed a child in a foster home and
the child subsequently was injured, and noting differences between foster home supervi-
sion and institutional supervision for purposes of the test); see also Doe v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 791 (2d Cir.) (holding that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to infer deliberate indifference by the placement bureau), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
52. 649 F.2d at 141-42.
53. Id.; see Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining that a
fourteenth amendment claim based upon an affirmative duty of care may overlap an
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"[g]overnment officials may be held liable under section 1983 for a
failure to do what is required as well as for overt activity which is
unlawful and harmful."
54
In 1982, the Supreme Court itself extended Estelle's rationale-
using the fourteenth rather than the eighth amendment-to an indi-
vidual involuntarily confined to a nonpenal institution. In Youngberg
v. Romeo, 55 the Court held that the State had a duty to provide a
patient involuntarily committed to a state mental institution with
"reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unrea-
sonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate training as
reasonably may be required by these interests."56 The plaintiffs in
DeShaney relied on the Youngberg decision to support their claim that
the State had an affirmative duty to protect Joshua from his father's
violence. The Court, however, rejected this contention indicating
that the Estelle-Youngberg analysis represents a narrow exception to
the general rule that states have no affirmative duty to protect indi-
viduals; it is the state's affirmative acts of incarceration or institu-
tionalization that, when coupled with its failure to provide for basic
human needs, transgress substantive limits on state action set by the
eighth amendment and the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.
57
2. The Evolution of Section 1983 Special Relationships.-In 1980,
the Supreme Court in Martinez v. California 5 8 implied in dicta that a
state, under certain circumstances, might be deemed to have de-
prived an individual of a substantive due process interest in life if
one of the state's parole officers released a prisoner who subse-
quently murdered the individual.59 The Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits relied on Martinez to conclude that once a state perceives a
danger to an individual from a third party and indicates a willing-
ness to protect that individual, the state then has an affirmative duty
eighth amendment duty to prisoners when the state places an individual in danger; this
could lead to the liability of prison personnel under § 1983 for prisoners' violence to-
ward one another).
54. Doe !, 649 F.2d at 141.
55. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
56. Id. at 307.
57. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
58. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
59. Id. at 285 (refusing to decide that a parole officer could never be deemed to
deprive someone of life by actions taken in connection with a prisoner's parole release,
but holding that, under the facts of the case, decedent's death at parolee's hands was too
remote a consequence of the parole officers' actions to hold them responsible under
§ 1983).
[VOL. 49:484492
DeShaney v. Winnebago County
to protect the potential victim.6 °
These Circuits perceived a special relationship6 basis for liabil-
ity in section 1983 claims that extended well beyond Doe J.62 As
alternative bases for liability, these courts noted that either a state's
knowledge of an individual's danger in conjunction with an expres-
sion of its intent to protect that individual, or an affirmative act of
the state that places an individual in danger, creates a special rela-
tionship which can support a section 1983 claim under the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause.63 For example, the Fourth
Circuit in Fox v. Custis6 recognized that a citizen might have a con-
stitutional right under the fourteenth amendment to protection
from a dangerous parolee if a "special custodial or other relation-
ship[]" existed between the state and the citizen.65 The right was
based on the fourteenth amendment, but "the shape and definition
60. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d
Cir. 1985) (State's knowledge that child had been beaten and faced a special danger
strengthens argument for a special relationship); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 193-
94 (4th Cir. 1984) (right to protection and corollary state duty may arise out of "custo-
dial or other relationships" created or assumed by states in respect of particular per-
sons), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421,
1426 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirmative undertaking of duty to protect and state's awareness of
danger to a specific person create a "special relationship").
61. The common law of torts does not impose a duty on defendants to act affirma-
tively to prevent harm to plaintiffs unless they were in a "special relationship." For ex-
ample, a defendant who gratuitously began to aid a plaintiff assumed a duty to act with
reasonable care, and that duty could not be abandoned merely at will. The defendant
would have been liable for injuries that the plaintiff suffered as a result of an aborted
rescue attempt. See Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1048 (1986). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324
(1965); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984).
62. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); see supra note 60.
63. Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1425 (listing (1) custodial relationship, (2) awareness of a
specific risk of harm to plaintiff, (3) affirmatively placing plaintiff in danger, or (4) affirm-
ative state commitment to protect plaintiff as factors to be considered in determining
whether special relationship existed); Estate of Bailey by Oare, 768 F.2d at 510-11 (State's
knowledge that a child had been beaten and faced a special danger strengthens argu-
ment for a special relationship);Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194 n.1 1 (listing (1) present or past
custody, (2) expressly stated desire to protect specific individuals, and (3) knowledge of
plaintiff's plight as factors to be considered); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th
Cir. 1982) (the state is an active tortfeasor if it puts a man in a position of danger from
private persons and then fails to protect him).
64. 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 88. A parolee, after committing several parole violations, burned a wo-
man's house, stabbed and shot a second woman, and raped and set fire to a third wo-
man. Id. at 86. The Fourth Circuit indicated that a fourteenth amendment duty could
arise out of special custodial "or other" relationships, but said no such relationship ex-
isted in this case because the state actors were unaware of any special danger the claim-
ants faced as distinguished from that faced by the general public. Id.
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that [the court] gave to that right by using the term 'custodial rela-
tionship' was influenced in large part by the considerations that lay
behind the eighth amendment cases." 6 6 That is, the court recog-
nized that the fourteenth amendment could not be interpreted to
impose on the states an affirmative duty to protect the general pub-
lic. But it nevertheless defined a more limited duty to individuals by
using a rationale similar to the one the Supreme Court used in Es-
telle: "where the state [takes] an individual from the public at large
and place[s] him in a position of danger, the state [is] enough of an
'active tortfeasor' to make it only 'just' that the state be charged with
an affirmative duty of protection. "67
Other circuits rejected the new special relationship doctrine. 68
The First,69 Seventh, 70 Eighth, 7 ' and Eleventh 72 Circuits construed
only involuntary custodial relationships as imposing on states an af-
firmative duty under the fourteenth amendment to protect an indi-
66. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Fox, 712
F.2d at 84), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). The court suggested that the term "special relation-
ship" had "acquired a life of its own," and "become a magic phrase, a category in which
to dump cases when a court would like to afford relief." Id.
69. Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23 (1st Cir. 1986) (estate of a
woman murdered by an inmate on furlough unable to recover under § 1983 due to the
absence of a special relationship between the victim and the State), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
882 (1986).
70. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 303-04
(7th Cir. 1987) (state's awareness of danger that particular child may be abused does not
give rise to a special relationship between the state and child which places on state a
constitutional duty to protect), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
Although the Seventh Circuit voiced its opposition to the expansion of "special
relationships," see id., the court held in a 1982 decision that a state may incur § 1983
liability if it takes an active role in placing an individual in a position of danger. Bowers
v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). The Fourth Circuit, however, perceived
the Seventh Circ fit in Bowers as expanding § 1983 liability beyond custodial relation-
ships because the Seventh Circuit did not distinguish between "custodial" and other
relationships. Thus, the Fourth Circuit said that Bowers narrowed the gap between the
eighth and fourteenth amendment analyses. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 193-94. In 1983, relying
in part on Bowers, the Fourth Circuit itself finally closed that gap in Fox v. Custis, 712
F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). The Fox court held that a consti-
tutional right based on the fourteenth amendment could arise from special "custodial or
other relationships." Id.
71. See Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 926-27 (8th Cir.
1987) (grandmother of a child killed by his mother after the state hospital released the
child to the mother's custody was unable to recover under § 1983 due to absence of
special relationship).
72. See Wideman v. Shallowford, 826 F.2d 1030, 1034-37 (11 th Cir. 1987) (mother of
prematurely-delivered infant had no claim against county for ambulance crew's refusal
to take her to the hospital of her choice).
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vidual's safety and well-being. By the time the Court granted
certiorari in DeShaney, the split in the Circuits was pronounced.
III. ANALYSIS
A. A Traditional Position on the Issue of States' Duties
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that neither the language
nor the history of the due process clause supported Joshua's conten-
tion that the fourteenth amendment imposes on states a duty to pro-
tect individuals from harms inflicted by third parties.73 The
language of the clause is cast in the negative as a prohibition, ex-
plained the Court, not in the affirmative as a command." The
Court also relied on historical interpretations denying that the due
process clause imposes affirmative obligations on the State.75 Thus,
the Court stated that "[t]he Framers were content to leave the ex-
tent of governmental obligation [to protect people from each other]
to the democratic political processes."
76
As further support, the Court pointed to prior decisions recog-
nizing that the due process clause confers no affirmative rights to
governmental aid, even when such aid is necessary to protect sub-
stantive due process rights.77 Thus, the majority reasoned, the State
73. 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
74. See Currie, supra note 38, at 865:
"[N]or shall any State" is the equivalent of"a State shall not." Moreover, what
the states are forbidden to do is to "deprive" people of certain things, and
depriving suggests aggressive state activity, not mere failure to help. The con-
trast with provisions of the same document imposing duties to conduct a cen-
sus, to return fugitives, and to guarantee a republican form of government-
and with language in other constitutions explicitly recognizing affirmative
rights to various social services-suggests that when constitution-makers im-
pose affirmative government obligations they tend to say so.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
75. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348
(1986) (an inmate's action against prison officials cannot be based on negligence)); id.
(citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (negligent act was not enough to
implicate the due process clause)); id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 (1981)
(fact that prison officials negligently lost inmate's mail, while admittedly a deprivation,
was not sufficient to constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment)). For historical
references, see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331. See generally Currie, supra note 38.
76. DeShaey, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
77. Id. The Court cites Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (no obligation
on states to fund abortions or other medical services), Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
74 (1972) (no obligation for states to provide adequate housing), and Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (states generally are under no constitutional duty to
provide substantive services for those within their borders). But see DeShaney, 109 S. Ct.
at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cites Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 383 (1971) (striking down a filing fee required to commence a divorce action) and
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cannot be held liable under the due process clause for injuries that it
could have averted had it chosen to provide protective services.
78
But this part of the Court's holding was predictable: ample pre-
cedent can be, and was, marshalled to support the Court's position.
Moreover, given the strength of the Court's conservative wing, it
would have been surprising for the Court to deviate far from Judge
Posner's position that "the Constitution is a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties."
79
B. Rolling Back Special Relationships
A more controversial aspect of the DeShaney decision was the
Court's rejection of the developing constitutional tort doctrine of
special relationships. In Youngberg, the Court reconciled its tradi-
tional position that "[a]s a general matter, a State is under no con-
stitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (a local government may not foreclose the
opportunity to speak in a public forum), for the proposition that "a State's actions-such
as the monopolization of a particular path of relief-may impose upon the State certain
positive duties." DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
relies upon Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (State held to
be a joint participant in discriminatory activity when its tenant discriminated against
black restaurant patron), for the proposition that "a State may be found complicit in an
injury even if it did not create the situation that caused the harm." DeShaney, 109 S. Ct.
at 1009. These cases, Brennan argues:
set a tone equally well established in precedent as, and contradictory to, the
one the Court sets by situating the DeShaneys' complaint within the class of
cases epitomized by the Court's decision in [Harris].... To put the point more
directly, these cases signal that a State's prior actions may be decisive in analyz-
ing the constitutional significance of its inaction. I thus would locate the
DeShaneys' claims within the framework of cases like Youngberg and Estelle, and
more generally Boddie and Schneider, by considering the actions that Wisconsin
took with respect to Joshua.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 87-92 for Brennan's argument that Wisconsin ef-
fectively monopolized child abuse protection, leaving Joshua with no possibility of res-
cue when the State failed to assist him.
In a recent essay, Professor Tribe argued that Justice Brennan should have distin-
guished Boddie from Estelle and Youngberg rather than drawing a parallel between them.
Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1989). Unlike Estelle and Youngberg, in Boddie "there had been
no previous state action directed at the individual. It was the legal structure itself...
that had isolated the person from the fulfillment of an important need." Id. Thus, Tribe
derives from Boddie the proposition that when the state's interest in that legal structure
does not override the individual plaintiff's interest, the creation of the legal structure is
a state action that violates due process. Id.
78. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004. But see The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases,
103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 168, 172 (1989) (questioning the strength of the Court's legal
reasoning).
79. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
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border," 80 with its holding that the State had a duty to provide an
involuntarily committed mental patient with "reasonably safe condi-
tions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints,
and such minimally adequate training as may be required by these
interests."" The DeShaney Court, however, was not willing to com-
promise its traditional position by permitting a noncustodial rela-
tionship to provide a basis for section 1983 liability. The Court
explained that custody based special relationships give rise to a
state's affirmative duty to protect only because the state has re-
stricted the individual's freedom to act in his own behalf.8 2 The
Court emphasized that the State's duty does not arise "from the
state's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expres-
sions of intent to help him."'83 Implicitly, only claimants who sur-
vive a narrowly applied "Estelle-Youngberg"84 analysis, that is, those
who are "institutionalized-and wholly dependant on the State,''85
can invoke the due process clause for a state's failure to protect.
The Court's decision appears to limit "special relationships" that
impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect an individual's
constitutionally protected interests to custodial relationships or
"other similar restraint[s] of personal liberty" that involve direct
physical control of the individual.86
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, focused not on the State's inaction, but rather on the
State's affirmative acts and framed them in terms of the common-
law tort doctrine that imposes a duty of care on rescuers.8 7 Brennan
80. 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
81. Id. at 322-24. Because liberty interests in safe conditions and freedom from bod-
ily restraint exist in patients involuntarily committed to mental institutions, the state has
a duty to provide minimally adequate training when such training is necessary to pre-
serve these interests.
82. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
85. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
86. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1000.
87. 109 S. Ct. at 1010-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1965). Although Justice Brennan framed his argument in terms of the
common-law tort rescue doctrine, constitutional tort law requires more to establish a
defendant's liability. Judge Posner explained the difference between the two in his opin-
ion for the Seventh Circuit in DeShaney:
[I]n any case of a botched rescue attempt... [one can] speculate that the victim
would have been better off without the attempt, because it may have impeded
competent attempts... that would have succeeded. This is one of the common
rationales offered for the common law tort rule that makes a rescuer liable for
his negligence in rescuing even if he had no duty to attempt the rescue in the
first place. The rule, however, is broader than this rationale; the plaintiff corn-
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noted that Wisconsin law directs public workers who suspect child
abuse to report their suspicions to the DSS.88 He then argued that
as a result of this policy, a worker "would doubtless feel her job was
done as soon as she had reported her suspicions of abuse to DSS."'8 9
The situation he described is analogous to that in which the rescuer
is held liable to the victim because he warned away other rescuers
and then left the scene.90 Moreover, Brennan characterized Wis-
consin's child protection program as effectively confining Joshua
within a violent home until the DSS decided to remove him.9 The
majority disregarded this argument and noted only that the rescue
doctrine could create a state's duty to protect under state tort law. 9
2
C. The Potential for Section 1983 Liability After DeShaney?
The Court's holding, following strict and traditional interpreta-
tions of the due process clause, nevertheless may be overcome by
three arguments under which a state could be held liable for a fail-
ure to protect. The strength of the facts will determine whether a
plaintiff may use any or all of these proposed arguments; the court's
emphasis on and interpretation of the facts then will determine a
plaintiff's success in using them. In addition, other barriers to con-
stitutional tort liability-the plaintiff's burden of establishing more
than mere negligence on the part of the government actor, causa-
tion, and when the defendant is a local governmental entity, attenu-
plaining of the defendant's negligent manner of rescue need not prove that, as
a matter of fact, the defendant's failure to complete the rescue made it less
probable that someone else would rescue him. Constitutional tort law, how-
ever, which ties a defendant's liability to depriving the plaintiff of some right,
cannot follow this path of expansion. A state can . . . impose tort duties on
persons who fail to rescue someone whose peril they did not cause-whose
liberty they did not take away-but a constitutional tort requires deprivation by
the defendant, and not merely a failure to protect the plaintiff from a danger
created by others.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir.
1987) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
88. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
89. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 323 comment (c) (1965). Under Wis-
consin law, rescuers who acted privately would be penalized in many cases if they disre-
garded the codified procedures for reporting child abuse; therefore, Joshua was
deprived of any possibility of rescue by anyone other than DSS personnel. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.981(6) (West 1987): "Whoever intentionally violates this section by
failure to report as required may be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than 6 months or both."
91. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1011.
92. Id. at 1006-07.
498 [VOL. 49:484
DeShaney v. Winnebago County
ated the requirement that state policy or custom be the cause of the
injury-will suffice to defeat many claims. 93
The first argument posits that child protection statutes give
claimants an "entitlement" to receive protective services as pro-
vided by the statute;94 the procedural component of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause protects claimants from the depriva-
tion of such entitlements by arbitrary state action.9 5 The second ar-
gument is in the nature of an exception to DeShaney: when a state
places an individual in a position of danger, it incurs an obligation
to protect that person. 96 Third, despite DeShaney, a state still may be
liable under section 1983 if it has "quasi-custody" of the plaintiff,
e.g., if the state places a child in a foster home and the child subse-
quently is injured.97
1. Entitlement.-The first argument would have Joshua charac-
terize his injury as a procedural due process claim for the loss of a
protected property -interest.98 Under this characterization, Joshua
93. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
95. "Procedural due process guarantees . . .a fair decision-making process before
the government takes some action directly impairing a person's life, liberty, or prop-
erty." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, § 10.6, at 322 (3d ed.
1986). By contrast, substantive due process "is concerned with the constitutionality of
the underlying rule rather than with the fairness of the process by which the government
applies the rule to'an individual." Id.
96. See infra notes 109-122 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 123-138 and accompanying text.
98. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1971); see also Comment,
supra note 61, at 1063-73. There is a fundamental difference between requiring a state
to provide services in the first place, and requiring a state to administer them fairly once
it provides the services of its own accord. Id. at 1064. The Supreme Court in DeShaney
and other cases held that a state is not required to provide services. What is not clear,
however, is whether a citizen's reliance on services extended by a state always obliges
the state to comply with procedural due process requirements when it withdraws the
service. In some cases, inaction effectively may withdraw a benefit. See id. at 1066-67.
The availability of procedural due process protection depends, in part, on the nature of
the entitlement, because the due process clause protects only those entitlements that are
considered property interests. Id. at 1065.
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. Property interests .. .are created by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Thus, "due process safeguards do not exist to protect benefits for
their own sake, but rather to protect the expectation a state creates by making promises
on which individuals rely." Comment, supra note 61, at 1065; see also Taylor By and
Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 798-99 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1337 (1989). In Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit used the Roth Court's holding that "pro-
cedural due process applies to the deprivation of interests encompassed within the four-
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possessed a statutory entitlement to protective services that should
have enjoyed procedural due process protection against state depri-
vation in accordance with the Court's decision in Board of Regents v.
Roth. 99 Roth held that once an entitlement is created through a
"source such as state law," the Constitution protects the entitlement
as a property interest by requiring a hearing before the state can
terminate the benefit.' 00 The Court has yet to consider this argu-
ment in the context of a private individual's statutory entitlement to
protection from harm. Because Joshua raised the argument for the
first time in his brief to the Court, the Court declined to address the
issue.101
The entitlement argument's success should hinge on specific
provisions of the statute in question because, as Roth admonished,
such interests are created through state law. 10 2 For example, the
Eleventh Circuit in Taylor by and Through Walter v. Ledbetter"0o held
that the Georgia foster care statutes created an interest that con-
sisted of the child's right to have the State investigate a foster home
before it actually places the child there and to oversee the foster
home in which it ultimately places the child.'0 4 If the State does
less, it deprives the child of the protected interest without due pro-
cess of law. In Joshua's situation, section 981(3)(c)(7) of the Wis-
teenth amendment's protection of liberty and property" in the case of a statutory
entitlement, to find a deprivation of liberty interests when officials failed to protect a
child from her foster parents' abuse.
[T]he Georgia scheme mandates that officials follow guidelines and take affirm-
ative actions to ensure the well being and promote the welfare of children in
foster care. These children can state a claim based on deprivation of a liberty inter-
est in personal safety when the officials fail to follow this mandate.
Id. (emphasis added). The court, however, noted that the state was free to alter its stat-
ute to eliminate the entitlement on which the child relied. Id. at 800.
99. 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (welfare
recipients are entitled to evidentiary hearings before a state may terminate benefits). In
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 798-800, the Eleventh Circuit carefully analyzed the child's claim that
she possessed an entitlement to particular services described in a Georgia statute which
governed foster care programs. In reversing the district court's decision that the statute
provided only procedural guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit found explicit mandates to
investigate and supervise foster parents and to inspect foster homes through visits made
at regular intervals. Thus, as Roth requires, the child's entitlement was firmly rooted in
state law. 408 U.S. at 577. Moreover, in contrast to the Wisconsin statute at issue in
DeShaney, the Georgia statute described in detail the services it generated. Compare GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-3, 49-5-8, 49-5-9, 49-5-12, 290-2-12-.08 (1986 & Supp. 1987) with
infra note 106.
100. 408 U.S. at 577.
101. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2.
102. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971).
103. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
104. Id. at 798-99.
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consin Children's Code required the local DSS units to "cooperate"
with other governmental agencies to "prevent, identify and treat
child abuse and neglect," and to "coordinate the development and
provision of services to abused and neglected children."' 5 The
generality of this mandate stands in sharp contrast to detailed provi-
sions in the immediately preceding Code subdivisions which de-
scribe the DSS's duties at the time a child abuse case first is reported
and for sixty days thereafter. 106 Under this scheme, Joshua arguably
had an interest in state protection for a specific period of time only
after each incident of abuse was reported. But Joshua's ability to
prove statutorily-defined protective services to which he was entitled
diminishes as the statutory benefits lose clear definition in subsec-
tion (7).107 The more specific the statutory provisions in question,
the stronger the plaintiff's case will be.
2. "Position of Danger. "--Second, the DeShaney Court implicitly
approved a rule that may be of use to some section 1983 plaintiffs:
"[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."'0 8 This
language acknowledges the "position of danger" rule that Judge
Posner most colorfully articulated in Bowers v. DeVito:'" 9 "[I]f the
state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and
then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was
merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown
him into a snake pit."" 0  Perhaps the best illustration of a state's
action that placed individuals in a position of danger is to be found
105. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(7) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
106. See generally id. § 48.981(3)(c)(1)-(6). For example, subdivision (1) of the Wiscon-
sin statute requires an investigation just like the Georgia statute under review in Taylor.
See supra note 99. This investigation must include an observation of, or an interview
with, the child and the statute recommends a visit to the home. Subdivision (4) requires
a departmental determination based upon evidence produced in the investigation
whether or not an abuse has "occurred or is likely to occur." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981(3)(c)(1), (4) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). It would seem thatJoshua could assert
successfully a property interest in, and entitlement to, both an investigation and a de-
partmental decision. But, with respect to subdivision (7), even ifJoshua could argue an
entitlement to protection, the nature of that protection is not defined. Moreover, the
operative language defining the State's duties is merely to "cooperate" and "coordi-
nate." Surely the State could show that it fulfilled both obligations, even in this case.
107. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(7); see also supra note 106.
108. 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
109. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); see Comment, supra note 61, at 1062-63.
110. 686 F.2d at 618.
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in White v. Rochford. "' In White, three minor children were riding in
a car driven by two of the children's uncle. After police officers
stopped and arrested the uncle for drag racing, the officers left the
children in the abandoned car on the side of the road. The Seventh
Circuit held that the police officers deprived the children of their
rights under the fourteenth amendment due process clause." 2
In Bowers, however, Posner held that the State had not placed
the plaintiff in a position of danger merely because it failed to pro-
tect her adequately from a dangerous parolee." 3 Posner chose, in
Bowers and other cases,"t 4 to restrict the rule's operation to the nar-
row circumstances in which the state actually took action, and where
that action substantially increased the likelihood that the victim
would suffer harm. The Supreme Court in DeShaney validated Judge
Posner's narrow application of the rule." 5
Two possible factual arguments that could invoke the rule can
be constructed from the facts in DeShaney. First, if the DSS
caseworkers had taken custody ofJoshua and subsequently returned
him to his father knowing that the father was an incorrigible child
abuser, then arguably they recklessly placed the child in a position
of great danger." 6 This scenario, which applies the "position of
danger" rule in a very straightforward fashion, "might" be accepta-
111. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
112. Id. at 384-85.
113. Id. In Bowers, an individual was convicted of aggravated battery with a knife. 606
F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 1982). The Illinois state mental health facility diagnosed him as
a "schizophrenic in remission" and released him. Id. He subsequently killed a young
woman with a knife. Id. The court found him not guilty by reason of insanity and again
committed him to the state mental health facility. Id. When the facility released him five
years later, he murdered Marguerite Bowers with a knife. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants knew the individual was dangerous and that they acted recklessly when
they released him. Id.
114. In Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), Judge Posner
held that a policeman's failure to save the occupants of a burning car was not actionable
because the occupants were already in great danger before the police arrived. Similarly,
Posner wrote in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298,
302 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), that because the increase in probability
that Joshua would be injured by his father was "trivial," the State could not be held to
have caused the injury. "The botched rescue must be distinguished from the case where
the state placed the victim in a situation of high risk, thus markedly increasing the
probability of harm and by doing so becoming a cause of the harm." Id. at 303.
115. 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
116. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303. Judge Posner qualified this remark by noting that to
so hold would require the court to go one step beyond Doe I, 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir.
1981), in which "the welfare department placed a child with foster parents and thus
retained custodial responsibility." For a discussion of the custody issue, see infra notes
122-137 and accompanying text.
502 [VOL. 49:484
DeShaney v. Winnebago County
ble even to a Posnerian court.' 17 Under a second construction of the
facts, the State itself placedJoshua in a position of danger because it
encouraged individuals to rely on the DSS for services essential to
child abuse prevention, and then failed to provide the services." 8
This latter argument relies on a reading of the facts similar to Justice
Brennan's.11 9
The first application of the rule is somewhat more viable, albeit
narrower, in that a conservative court might find it more acceptable
than the second.' 21 Judge Posner almost certainly would have re-
117. There is language in the Supreme Court's opinion in DeShaney, however, which
suggests that even if a Posnerian court accepted this application of the "position of dan-
ger" rule, the Supreme Court might not accept it.
That the State once took temporary custody ofJoshua does not alter the analy-
sis, for when it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse
position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all; the State
does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having
once offered him shelter.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
118. See Comment, supra note 61, at 1063.
119. Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens and governmental bodies other
than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything more than re-
port their suspicions of child abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these
suspicions, no one will step in to fill the gap. Wisconsin's child protection pro-
gram thus effectively confined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of Randy
DeShaney's violent home until such time as DSS took action to remove him.
Conceivably, then, children like Joshua are made worse off by the existence of
this program, when the persons and entities charged with carrying it out fail to
do their jobs.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. For additional cases in which courts applied the logic of the "position of danger"
rule even if it did not explicitly use that phrase, see Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814
F.2d 277, 281 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (woman was killed by inmate driving fully
equipped official patrol car with authorization of sheriff); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d
381, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1979) (officer arrested driver of car and left passenger children
stranded in driverless automobile on eight lane highway); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 9-
10 (7th Cir. 1972) (defendant police officers stood by as fellow officers beat plaintiff).
In White, the court also discussed an alternative approach to the due process claim
at issue: instead of determining whether the officer's conduct should be characterized as
malfeasance or nonfeasance, it considered the egregiousness of the State's conduct.
Leaving the children unprotected on the highway violated the due process clause be-
cause the action fell within a class of state intrusions against personal integrity which
"shock the conscience." White, 592 F.2d at 383-84. The court focused on the state's
conduct that ran "counter to fundamental notions of fairness." Id. at 385. The phrase
"shock the conscience" was coined in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), in
which police ordered a detainee's stomach pumped to obtain evidence. This was
deemed by the Court offensive to "a sense ofjustice" and violative of due process. Id. at
166, 172-73.
It is unlikely that a "shock the conscience" argument would apply in Joshua's case
because his injury was not inflicted directly by the State. See also Taylor v. Watters, 636
F. Supp. 181, 186-87, 188-89 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (police officers' conduct in standoff with
gunman allegedly placed hostage in greater danger such that Bowers and Jackson were
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jected the second application of the rule1 2 ' and it would be unlikely
to succeed in many courts generally-such an application would ap-
pear to stretch the rule too far. The contrast between Justice Bren-
nan's and Judge Posner's views suggests that the scope of the
"position of danger" rule is at the court's discretion. Indeed, a
comparison of the two interpretations of the "position of danger"
rule highlights the significant role which judicial discretion plays in
validating the argument in a particular case. Although its time has
not yet come, a willing judiciary could give the rule broader scope.
3. Quasi-custody.-The decisions in Doe I and Taylor and the
Court's dicta in DeShaney suggest the third argument for potential
state liability for failure to protect children in foster homes.' 22 Even
after DeShaney, it arguably is proper to impose liability on the state
for having acted affirmatively to place children in foster homes in
which they later were abused. Such children are in the quasi-custody
of the state if the state has continuing obligations to assess the qual-
ity of the foster home it placed them in and to act to protect the
children if its quality deteriorates. 123
Although the DeShaney facts did not raise the issue of a state's
liability for foster child abuse, DeShaney will affect the development
of the law in that and related areas. For example, in Stoneking v.
Bradford Area School District,124 the Third Circuit recently considered
a public high school student's argument that she was in the "func-
tional custody" of school authorities when she was sexually abused
by a teacher because the student's freedom of movement was re-
strained by a state law that required school attendance.' 25 The
distinguishable; facts also were analyzed in "shock the conscience" terms), rev'd, 655 F.
Supp. 801, 803-04, 806 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (without qualified expert witness who could
testify as to recklessness of police conduct, there was no support for the "shock the
conscience" analysis and Bowers and Jackson were not distinguishable).
121. To accept the plaintiffs' syllogism would be to impose by another route a
duty to provide basic services. Here the state acted promptly but, it is alleged,
ineffectually. The next case if this one succeeds will be one where the police
and fire departments, maybe because of budget cuts, do not arrive at the scene
of the, accident at all.
Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983).
122. Doe I, 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981); Taylor By and Through Walker v. Led-
better, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); DeShaney,
109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9.
123. Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 141. One might argue that a child also is in the state's quasi-
custody when a court finds the child to be neglected, but then returns the child to the
parent with the understanding that the state has a continuing obligation to monitor the
child's welfare.
124. 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989).
125. Id. at 723-24.
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court said that the student's argument was "not inconsistent" with
DeShaney, because of the uncertainty of the special relationship doc-
trine, however, the court decided the case on other grounds. 1 26
Nevertheless, in Philadelphia Police and Fire Association for Handicapped
Children v. Philadelphia, '127 an earlier post-DeShaney decision, the same
court had rejected a constructive custody argument that mentally
handicapped citizens who lived in their own homes were in the
State's custody because they had entered the state care system. The
Third Circuit held that DeShaney foreclosed constructive custody ar-
guments because only a state's affirmative act of restraining an indi-
vidual's freedom to act on his or her behalf triggers a state's duty to
provide care. 128
These two decisions give useful guidance to litigants searching
for the outer boundaries of state custody in noninstitutional set-
tings. It does not appear unreasonable to argue that once a state
has placed a child in a foster home, it has restrained the child's per-
sonal liberty by placing the child under the foster parents' domin-
ion. This may qualify as an "other similar restraint of personal
liberty"'' 29 in satisfaction of the 'deprivation of liberty' require-
ment."3 The DeShaney Court in a footnote observed, without decid-
ing, that should foster parents be considered state agents, "we
might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or in-
stitutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect. ' ' ,3 1
The Court's decision in Youngberg '3 2 to extend 'special relationship'
duties to a state mental institution supports this exception.
In a recent Fourth Circuit decision, Milburn v. Anne Arundel
County Department of Social Services,' 3 the court emphasized the im-
portance of state agency in a case in which a Maryland youth sued
his abusive foster parents under section 1983.' The court held
126. The court, without either rejecting or approving her functional custody argu-
ment, found the school district and principals liable, not because of an affirmative duty
to protect, but because a state actor inflicted her injury and the school administration's
deliberate indifference amounted to a state practice, policy, or custom. Id. at 724-26.
127. 874 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 168.
129. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1000.
130. See, e.g., Taylor By and Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11 th
Cir. 1987) ("a child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation analogous to a
prisoner in a penal institution"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
131. 109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9.
132. 457 U.S. 307, 387 (1982); see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
133. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
134. The court focused almost exclusively on the issue of agency and analyzed both
the facts and pertinent case law in detail. Id. at 476-79.
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that the foster parents and the State were not in an agency relation-
ship because the State of Maryland exercised little power over the
foster parents, and "the care of foster children is not traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State." 135 Moreover, the child's par-
ents placed him in the foster home, not the State. 136 Ultimately,
agency determinations will vary from state to state according to stat-
utes, contracts, and other evidence.'3 7 Unfortunately, it appears
that this argument will help plaintiffs only if they are able to prove
state agency.
D. The Outcome of DeShaney
In spite of the "statutory entitlement," "position of danger"
and "quasi-custody" arguments outlined here, DeShaney should put
to rest much of the discord among the circuits with respect to the
scope of constitutional tort liability based on the special relationship
doctrine. DeShaney will affect constitutional tort law by restricting
substantive due process claims based upon a state's failure to pro-
tect an individual to the narrow range of eighth amendment-like sit-
uations to which the claims were confined before the 1980s. 138 It
also will dispatch the hopes of those who would have used the
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits' expansion of the special relation-
ship doctrine to force states to improve their child abuse prevention
programs. 13 9
The states and municipalities protected by the decision will re-
ply that were DeShaney decided otherwise, the burden of liability
would have stifled initiatives to introduce or improve local social
service programs. 140  This argument makes sense only at first
glance. In the long run, Joshua will cost Wisconsin taxpayers dearly
whether the State pays a one-time judicial award or maintains him
for the rest of his life in a state hospital. 4 ' As such, the State would
135. Id. at 479.
136. Id. at 476.
137. See id. at 476-77.
138. See 109 S. Ct. at 1004-06.
139. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 723 (3d Cir. 1989)
(after DeShaney, state common-law duties can no longer be the basis for a constitutional
duty to protect students from harm); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social
Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir.) (after DeShaney, failure to report child abuse not
actionable under § 1983), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
140. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 (1980); Archie v. City of Ra-
cine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1218, 1223-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338
(1989); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 304 (7th
Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
141. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002. In 1984, it cost the State of Wisconsin $107.55 per
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have much to gain if it instituted a more effective prevention pro-
gram because the program's benefits would outweigh both the eco-
nomic costs of funding and the likely social costs of ignoring child
abuse. It seems tenable to argue that liability could increase the effi-
ciency of inefficient state programs.' 4 2
Even ignoring this argument and assuming that liability results
in net losses for the State, the Court need not have eliminated spe-
cial relationship-based liability or limited due process protections
for individuals as sharply as it did to protect state governments.
The evidentiary burden on plaintiffs of showing the government ac-
tor's state of mind, 43 reasonably direct causation, 44 and when the
defendant is a local government entity, state policy or custom as the
origin of the injury,' 4 5 gives states a distinct courtroom advantage.
day to maintain a resident in its institutions for the mentally retarded or developmen-
tally disabled. D. BRADDOCK, R. HEMP & R. HOWES, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES FOR MENTAL
RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: STATE PROFILES
850 (Public Policy Monograph Series, No. 5, The University of Illinois at Chicago,
1984). At that rate, the State ultimately will spend a great deal of money on Joshua
regardless of whether it is judicially liable for his injuries. Of course, the State also loses
whatever earnings Joshua would have contributed to its economy. And, where children
are not injured as severely asJoshua was, there are important social costs associated with
child abuse. See, e.g., Blager & Martin, Speech and Language of Abused Children, in THE
ABUSED CHILD, A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES AND TREAT-
MENT 83 (1976) [hereinafter THE ABUSED CHILD]; Martin & Breezeley, Personality of
Abused Children, in THE ABUSED CHILD, supra, at 105; Martin & Rodeheffer, Learning and
Intelligence, in THE ABUSED CHILD, supra, at 93. These social costs translate into heavy
fiscal burdens on government. See D. DARO, CONFRONTING CHILD ABUSE 155-60 (1988)
(estimating medical, foster care, juvenile delinquency, criminal rehabilitation, and lost
earnings costs of child abuse in America in 1983).
142. If we assume, as Justice Brennan asserted, that the State of Wisconsin monopo-
lized child abuse prevention services for all intents and purposes, then almost by defini-
tion, the State was not constrained by any market force to allocate its resources to
provide the greatest benefit to its citizens at the lowest cost. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at
1009-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). And now DeShaney, together with the DSS's statutory
immunity, see infra note 147, has effectively eliminated any liability considerations that
might have encouraged the State to allocate its resources more efficiently or even to
ensure that services are provided at all, once offered. The DSS directors currently .'ave
no incentive to improve services because a financial penalty is imposed on the state
agency responsible for child abuse prevention only in the narrowest circumstances. The
reason, in part, is because financial responsibility shifts to another agency. In Joshua's
case, that responsibility fell to the agency that oversees the institutional care of the men-
tally retarded. There is an argument to be made that, under a cost-benefit analysis, the
improved allocation of resources among the various prevention and intervention strate-
gies used to confront child abuse can achieve both financial and social benefits. See D.
DARO, supra note 141, at 149-98.
143. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.
344 (1986); supra note 75.
144. See, e.g., Martinez, 444 U.S. 277; supra note 42.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
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These requirements are substantial barriers to liability and give
states enough protection that their fear of liability should not extin-
guish their desire to legislate socially useful programs.
CONCLUSION
The DeShaney decision is rooted firmly in traditional constitu-
tional interpretation. The Court has joined with its forbears who
understood the negative language of the Constitution to protect the
people of this country only from an overreaching government. With
DeShaney, the Court drew the curtain on a decade in which the courts
sought to protect members of society more effectively from govern-
ment recklessness in the guise of its failure to act. In so doing, it
explicitly encourages legislatures across the country to pass laws
that will hold states liable for their reckless omissions. 146 To the
extent that DeShaney prevails upon state legislatures to enact such
laws, it is a laudable decision. But when proponents of change can
no more prevail upon their legislatures than Joshua could prevail
upon this Court, DeShaney's constitutional traditionalism will tri-
umph at the expense of those who have no other recourse. 147
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U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (although official policy is a touchstone for § 1983 actions against
the government, the showing of a government custom also will support a claim).
146. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
147. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(4) (1987), entitled "Immunity from liability," which
broadly protects individuals and institutions from liability resulting from action pursu-
ant to § 48.981. The statute seems to support arguments for the tort immunity of both
the DSS caseworker and the Winnebago County Social Services Department from any
charges Joshua brought against them under the statute. Given this, it is obvious that
appeals to the Wisconsin courts to provide Joshua with a remedy would fall on deaf ears.
Joshua's fourteenth amendment attack was, therefore, the only avenue open to him.
* Maryland Law Review would like to thank Jana B. Singer, Assistant Professor of
Law at the University of Maryland School of Law, for her review of this manuscript and
for her many helpful suggestions as we prepared it for publication.
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